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Category Archives: Berkouwer

G C Berkouwer’s approach to theology

“I believe that without genuine curiosity … theology will not do well. I regret every sign that theologians have lost their curiosity. It happens when we are satisfied with a small territory we have created for ourselves and lose our feel for new perspectives and new opportunities for enrichment. Besides, without the tensions of curiosity there is little hope for any essential corrections in one’s own insights. A complacency sets in, a feeling that the gospel has been adequately thought about and understood, and that we can restfully settle down with what has already been said. A curiosity that works itself out in passionate study and serious listening to others promises surprises, clearer insight and deeper understanding – no matter from which direction they come. And so curiosity brings a certain joy as we walk through the challenging terrain.” —G.C. Berkouwer

G. C. Berkouwer – Scholarly, Pastoral and Evangelical

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These comments are taken from the Jack Rogers book, “Confessions of a Conservative Evangelical” (Philadelphia, 1974).

Berkouwer was reared in a denomination which “began in rather conservative isolation … he has developed a scholarly, pastoral, evangelical stance. And he has brought a whole denomination with him” (p. 143) – “you can become less conservative and more evangelical” (12).

Saved by Grace, Reaching out with Grace

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“the church may not function as a fearful border guard, but rather as one who brings good tidings (Rom. 10:15; Is. 52:7) …. For Christ died for us ‘while we were yet sinners, while we were enemies’ (Rom. 5:8,10). All hardness, imprudence and rashness can only be signs that she has forgotten the gracious overstepping of the boundaries at her birth” [G. C. Berkouwer, "The Church" (Grand Rapids, 1976), p. 162].

Berkouwer on Social Concern and Sanctification

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Berkouwer approaches social concern from a Biblical and Reformed perspective. In Ephesians 2:8-10, the emphases ‘by grace’ and ‘through faith’ lead directly on to the emphasis ‘for good works’. Berkouwer underscores this connection between ‘Sola Fide and Sanctification’ (Chapter II, pp. 17-44). He emphasizes that the true nature of good works cannot be understood apart from Christ who is our ’sanctification’ (1 Corinthians 1:30) (p. 21). Sanctification is not ‘the humanly operated successor to the divinely worked justification (p. 78). ‘Genuine sanctification’ has a ‘continued orientation toward justification’ (p. 78). Berkouwer emphasizes the ‘by grace … through faith’ context in which the ‘for good works’ character of sanctification expresses itself. He draws attention to the nature of the Spirit’s work in sanctification: ‘The Spirit alone could perform the miracle of making man walk on the road of sanctity without a sense of his own worth’ (p. 78). The life of sanctification has a gracious character which Berkouwer observes in the parable of the unprofitable servants (p. 41) and a social context which he sees in the parable of the good Samaritan (A Half Century of Theology, p. 191). A Reformed theology, grounded in the ‘Scripture alone’ principle, seeks to rightly represent the purpose of Scripture – ‘to instruct you for salvation through faith in Christ Jesus … that the man of God may be complete, equipped for every good work (2 Timothy 3:15, 17). Berkouwer, in his discussion entitled ‘The Imitation of Christ’ (Chapter VII, pp. 135-160), emphasizes both the gracious character and the social context of the Biblical teaching concerning sanctification.

Our Faith is rooted in the Truth of the Gospel.

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Berkouwer emphasizes both objectivity and subjectivity.

He does this by emphasizing that faith’s subjective certainty is rooted in the truth of the Gospel.

“Faith involves a certain subjectivity, … a subjectivity which has meaning only as it is bound to the gospel.” (Faith and Justification, p. 30).

“the church’s … certainty is bound to certain norms and … a feeling of subjective certainty does not guarantee irrefutable certainty … it is not the certainty, but the truth in the certainty that makes us free … there is away of understanding Holy Scripture that does not estrange us from the gospel.” (Holy Scripture, p. 20).

Berkouwer and Systematic Theology

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Sometimes, it is said that Berkouwer’s theology is not very systematic. In my book, I comment on this kind of criticism. I think that, to appreciate the systematic quality of Berkouwer’s theology, you need to get deeply into it, reading quite a bit of his work and thinking along with him.
I have tended to regard his work on ‘Holy Scripture’ & ‘Divine Election’ as important though admittedly, many others are less happy with these volumes).
The more I reflected on these books, the more I felt that he wasn’t being unsystematic. He was opening up perspectives which shed new light on to these doctrines.
In my book, I expound Berkouwer’s doctrines of Scripture & election, seeking – along the way – to defend his approach against his critics.
An important aspect of Berkouwer’s approach is summed up in the two principles – Speak where Scripture speaks. Remain silent where Scripture remains silent.
There is, however, another aspect of Berkouwer’s approach which is worthy of mention. He was a creative thinker. The first book to alert me to Berkouwer was P E Hughes (ed.), Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology’. By describing him as a creative thinker, I’m not suggesting that he goes his own way, creating his own theology while paying little attention to the Scriptures. He has, however, shown a willingness to re-think theological interpretations which many have thought were settled & not up for discussion.
An example of this is found in his way of handling the doctrine of election where, being unwilling simply to set divine sovereignty & human responsibility over against each other and leave it at that, he suggests a way in which we might affirm both in a more harmonious manner.

Faith in Scripture as God’s Word

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Berkouwer criticizes “an incorrect conception of theology, a conception of theology, a conception which considers it possible to discuss Holy Scripture apart from a personal relationship of belief in it, as though that alone would constitute true ‘objectivity’.” (Holy Scripture, pp. 9-10).

He holds that those who view Scripture in this way “wrongly … see involvement and correlation as subjectivism” (Holy Scripture, p.10). Such a misguided fear of subjectivism lapses into a false objectivism with its suggestion that Christian truth can be considered without direct reference to the believer’s personal involvement with that truth.

Berkouwer maintains that there must be a proper understanding of the correlation between faith and its object. He emphasizes that “faith is decisively determined by the object of faith, namely God and His Word”. He rejects the idea that “Scripture … derives its authority from the believer’s faith”, insisting that “this idea is already rendered untenable by the very nature of faith, which rests on and trusts in the Word of God.” (Holy Scripture, p. 10).

This understanding of the correlation between faith and its object is carefully distinguished from “philosophical relativism” (Faith and Justification, p. 9). Berkouwer’s idea of “relativity … refers simply to the relation of a thing to something other than itself” (Faith and Justification, p. 9).

Berkouwer does not intend to call in question the authority of Scripture for theological reflection. His concern is to understand the true nature of Biblical authority.

Understanding Christian Truth

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Berkouwer emphasizes that, if we are to understand God’s truth, we must take account of two important points:
* The question of truth in itself cannot be asked without also involving ourselves in the question of truth for me.
* To ask the question of truth for me is to find that truth for me has its foundation in truth in itself (Holy Scripture, pp. 9-10).
We will explore the relationship the relationship between truth in itself and truth for me by looking at what Berkouwer says about (a) God; (b) Man.
(a) God
Insisting that the question of God is more than an abstract question concerning His existence, Berkouwer maintains that we must enquire about God with the kind of religious attitude expressed in the words of Micah 7:18 – ‘Who is a God like Thee, pardoning iniquity, and passing over transgression … ‘. When we ask the question of God in this way, we open ourselves to the atmosphere of ‘a latent doxology, a rapturous hymn (A. Weiser)’, an atmosphere ‘that leaves all doubt behind as it revels in admiration of Israel’s God’. Observing that ‘(m)any of the questions of our time arise not in doxology but in doubt’, Berkouwer points out that discussion of the traditional arguments for the existence of God is a far cry from asking the question of the living God. While the God of the old natural theology can be discussed abstractly, the living God can never be removed to such a comfortable distance. Maintaining that the God of Christian theology – the God of revelation – is more than a deduction which can drawn from the traditional proofs for His existence, he insists that we must move beyond the question ‘Does God exist?’ to the next question, ‘Who is God?’. Describing this second question as ‘a most existential and relevant question’, he contrasts it with the first question, pointing out that it is ‘not a theoretical question about God’s existence as a “thing”‘. He insists that asking the question, ‘Who is God?’ involves us in our entire experience of life as we enquire about its meaning and purpose. Enquiring about God in this way leads us on to further questions – ‘What do we mean by his presence in the world? Where does he reveal himself here and now?’. An openness to God and His revelation allows the possibilty of asking the question of God doxologically. Doxology is the only appropriate alternative to doubt. Doxology does not depend on the foundation of a faith that is built on a natural theology. On the basis of God’s salvation (and not that of natural theology’s attempt to prove God’s existence), the believer is deeply moved to worship God (A Half Century of Theology, pp.76-77; General Revelation, p.134).
(b) Man
For much of modern theology, the question, ‘What is man?’ must precede the question, ‘Who is God?’. The approach which begins with man (theology from below) is often set against the approach which begins with God (theology from above). In this situation of much confusion – with one side speaking out against the other side without really listening to what is being said from the other side – , Berkouwer’s doctrine of man has been commended as ‘a middle course between conflicting theologies … achieved by a strenuous independence of mind’ (These words of A. Willingdale – from a review in The Evangelical Quarterly – are cited on the front / inside dust cover of Berkouwer’s book, Man: The Image of God).
* Berkouwer emphasizes that man cannot be understood properly apart from God – ‘man’s nature … is not self-enclosed, and … can never be understood outside of its relation to God’ (Man: The Image of God, pp.22-23).
* He insists that divine sovereignty and human freedom are not be set over against each other. Emphasizing that the divine superiority is ‘the personal superiority of love and grace which in man’s experience is making room for him to act by not destroying his freedom’, he writes, ‘The divine act makes room, leaves open the possibility for man’s act. That possibility is not absorbed or destroyed by divine superiority, but called forth by it’ (Divine Election, pp. 49, 46).
* He emphasizes that man’s relation to God is inescapable so that, even in his guilt, the life of man is affected by divine grace. Taking full account of the radical effect of sin by emphasizing that there is ‘not … some last reserve in man, some untouched and untouchable ‘part’ of man which has escaped the power of in and corruption’ Berkouwer insists tha man has not been dehumanized. Despite the fact that we have sinned and fallen short of God’s glory, we still remain man created in God’s image and called to glorify Him in our life as His creation – ‘Man stands and remains standing in his human responsibility and in his human guilt over against God’ (Man: The Image of God, pp. 127, 135).
* In emphasizing the relation beteen God and man, Berkouwer takes care to avoid the ‘erroneous’ interpretation of ‘the concept of relation’ which suggests that ‘man exists only in relation to God, and God exists only in relation to man’. Over against any suggestion that God is no more than a figment of our imagination and we are no more than a figment of His imagination, he maintains that, in using the concept of relation – God and man are understood in relation to each other – , we must speak also of ‘reality’. By emphasizing both reality and relation, we are maintaining ‘the Biblical outlook’ which ‘does not sacrifice reality to relation’ (p.35). When we emphasize the relation between man and God, we acknowldege that we cannot, without reference to God our Creator and Redeemer, give an adequate answer to the question, ‘What is man?’. When we ask this question Biblically, we think not only of man but also of God. To enquire – in a Biblical way – about the meaning and purpose of our human experience is to move from the pathway of defiance – we don’t need God – into the pathway of doxology – we worship God. In worship, we do not only ask, ‘What is man?’. We ask, ‘What is man that Thou art mindful of him … ?’ (Psalm 8:4)..
Returning to our initial observation regarding truth in itself and truth for us, we make two important points concerning Biblical truth.
* Biblical truth is truth in itself regardless of whether we believe it. If, however, we persist in unbelief, it is, in our experience, truth which stands over against us as a judgment upon our sinful unbelief. We cannot escape the presence of God simply by asserting, ‘I don’t believe in Him’. We may choose not to take God seriously. He will continue to take us seriously – in His judgment.
* Biblical truth remains truth which stands over against us in judgment until, through faith in Jesus Christ our Saviour, it becomes truth for us, a powerful, life-changing truth which leads us to glorify God as we learn to honour Him as our Creator and Redeemer.

Revelation and Reconciliation

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‘Serious reservations … must be voiced against the dominant position of the idea of revelation in theology, with its corollary that man’s essential predicament is his lack of knowledge … if the ignorance of man stands at the center, then the fact of revelation relieves that plight; but if man’s guilt is the problem, then not revelation but reconciliation must become the theological centrum’ (C E Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, p.14).
Building on Braaten’s comment, we emphasize two important points:
(i) Man’s basic need lies in his sinfulness rather than his finitude;
(ii) That need is met by reconciliation to God rather than mere knowledge about God.
In his treatment of the doctrine of Scripture, Berkouwer places the doctrine of reconciliation at the centre. Divine revelation is not merely an antidote for human ignorance. Scripture must be understood with respect to its specific intention (Holy Scripture, p.125), which is ‘most closely related to salvation’ (p. 142). An adequate doctrine of Scripture demands a proper understanding of the function as a pointer to Christ, through whom believing man receives eternal life (p.125). The revelation that comes to us through the Scriptures is precisely ‘(t)he powerful operation of the Spirit’ which ‘centres in the salvation that has appeared in Christ’ (p.49). This work of the Spirit, pointing to a salvation that calls for the response of faith, is central to Berkouwer’s understanding of the doctrine of Scripture:
‘Believing Scripture does not mean staring at a holy and mysterious book, but hearing the witness concerning Christ. The respect for the concrete words is related precisely to this, and the ‘is’ of the confession (Scripture is the Word of God) points to the mystery of the Spirit, who wants to bind men to Christ through these words, through this witness’ (p.166).
‘It is possible to live with Scripture only when the message of Scripture is understood and is not considered ‘a metaphysical document’, but a living instrument serving God for the proclamation of salvation’ (p. 333).
The relation of God’s Spirit to Scripture is essentially connected with the concepts of guilt and reconciliation rather than the ‘revelation’ of a knowledge which is primarily cognitive. Assurance concerning the authority of Scripture is directly related to Christian experience. Such assurance is the expression of the faith which trusts Christ and finds Him trustworthy (p.241).
The assurance that God’s Spirit continues to speak through Scripture concerning Christ is quite different from the kind of rationalism which turns the ‘is’ of the confession – Scripture is the Word of God – into ‘a rationally developed infallibility of Scripture that was supposed to preclude all doubts’ (p.32). (Note: It should not be supposed that Berkouwer has no doctrine of the infallibility of Scripture. His criticism is directed not aginst the notion of Biblical infallibility as such but against a particular conception of infallibility – ‘a rationally developed infallibility’).
Berkouwer’s criticism of ‘a rationally developed infallibilty of Scripture that was supposed to preclude all doubts’ is directed against an approach to Scripture which operates primarily on a cognitive level with its concern for infallible and inerrant information. He suggests that this formalized notion of infallible and inerrant truth threatens to undermine the true meaning of faith.
Faith is not simply an addendum to cognitive knowledge concerning infallible and inerrant truth. It is misleading to place cognitive assent to a certain theory of the infallibility and inerrancy of Scripture prior to believing trust in Jesus Christ. When ‘ rationally developed infallibility of Scripture that was designed to preclude all doubts’ is made the prerequisite of reliable knowledge of Jesus Christ, this suggests that one believes the Bible with a different ‘faith’ from the faith which trusts Christ. Such a notion involves concepts of faith, truth and knowledge that are primarily intellectual in nature. The suggestion is that faith is to be thought of as assent to an external authority.
Critical of this rather static understanding of truth, Berkouwer directs our attention to the dynamic aspect of truth suggested by Bible passages which describe faith’s relation to truth in terms of doing the truth (John 3:21), walking in the truth (2 John 4; 3 John 4), being set free by the truth (John 8:32) and being sanctiifed by the truth (John 17:19).
In making this criticism of ‘a rationally developed infallibility of Scripture designed to preclude all doubts’, Berkouwer is encouraging us to take care to avoid building our doctrine of Scripture on a concept of knowledge that is so generalized that it fails to appreciate the truly religious nature of our knowledge of God: ‘For the purpose of the God-breathed Scripture is not at all to provide a scientific gnosis in order to convey and increase human knowledge and wisdom, but to witness of the salvation of God unto faith’. Clarifying his meaning, he comments, ‘ This approach does not mean to separate faith and knowledge. But the knowledge that is the unmistakable aim of Scripture is the knowledge of faith’ (p.180).
Berkouwer’s perspective is not concerned with infallible information secured by inspiration. Holding that ‘the nature of the God-breathed character of Scripture cannot be deduced by means of various analogies to the inspiration’, Berkouwer contends that ‘Scripture is the Word of God because the Holy Spirit witnesses in it of Christ’ (p.162).
By speaking of the Holy Spirit’s witness to Jesus Christ, Berkouwer does not intend to draw our attention away from the human witness to Jesus Christ. Rather, he seeks to direct our attention to the ‘deep dimension of the human witness’. Concerning this ‘deep dimension’, he writes, ‘This witness does not well up from the human heart but from the witness of God, in which it finds its foundation and empowering as a human witness’ (p.165). With this conception of Scripture as ‘human witness empowered by the Spirit’, Berkouwer maintains that ‘the Word of God does not draw us away from the human but involves us with the human’ (p.167).
Berkouwer’s appreciation of the human aspect of Scripture, his insight into the relation between the Spirit and Scripture, and his distinction between the nature of the knowledge of God and other types of knowledge each constitute important elements in an adequate doctrine of Scripture.
Berkouwer is in basic agreement with Braaten’s remark that the concept of reconciliation, as an antidote to man’s guilt, should be more central in our theological thinking than the concept of revelation as an antidote to man’s ignorance. It should not, however, be assumed that he is ready to dispense with the idea of revelation and replace it directly with the idea of reconciliation.
Berkouwer’s understanding of the relation of revelation and reconciliation can be explored further by turning our attention to a book which contains the word, ‘revelation’, in its title – General Revelation.
Here, Berkouwer emphasizes both the reality of God’s revelation in creation and sinful man’s inability to understand this revelation. He maintains that there is ‘an objective revelation of God in His works which man … can no longer read because of the darkening of his understanding’. Taking account of human sin without denying the divine revelation in creation, Berkouwer affirms that ‘the spectacles of special revelation … are needed in order to read the revelation in creation’ (p.30).
Expanding on this point, he emphasizes that general revelation can only be understood through grace. He insists that the one who has come to experience the grace of God in salvation is alone able to understand the revelation of God in creation. Writing on ‘The Nature Psalms’, he states this succinctly: ‘nature is not seen isolated from the salvation of the God of Israel … man in and by the salvation of God is delivered from the tenacity of the egocentric and commences to sing of the glory of God. It is this salvation that opens doors and windows towards God’s handiwork … This understanding, and seeing, and hearing, is possible only in the communion with him, in the enlightenment of the eyes by the salvation of God’ (pp.128, 131).
Berkouwer affirms that while there is an objective revelation of God in creation, we can only understand that revelation properly when we experience reconciliation to God through Jesus Christ. While the idea of reconciliation is central to Berkouwer’s theology, it should not be assumed that that God’s act of reconciliation in Jesus Christ constitutes the entirety of God’s revelation. God revealed Himself first in creation prior to man’s sin and, therefore, prior to the need for reconciliation. Since man has sinned, he is no longer able to rightly understand this revelation. Man’s sin, therefore, occasioned the need for ‘the revelation of reconciliation’ (p.26).
The redemptive revelation should not be seen as replacing the creational revelation. God has revealed Himself redemptively because of the failure of sinful man, and not because of any failure in His creational revelation. The purpose of creational revelation was not redemptive, for, prior to his sin, man did not require to be redeemed. Redemptive revelation has a restorative character. Man’s original relationship with God, spoiled by his sin, is restored through the revelation of reconciliation.
The full process of the revelation of reconciliation includes five elements:
(a) The creational revelation through which God gave Himself to man in a relationship not yet marred by sin. That revelation remains revelation after man’s sin, though it is not properly understood until man’s sinful blindness is removed through God’s redemption.
(b) The incarnation in which God Himself became man with the purpose of delivering man from sin and death (The Work of Christ, p.28).
(c) The Scriptures which serve as ‘a living instrument serving God for the proclamation of the message of salvation’ (Holy Scripture, p.333).
(d) Proclamation which calls for the Church to be joyful and faithful servants of the Redeemer and His mesasage of redemption. Through the Church’s very human witness, Christ speaks His divine Word to the world. (Proclamation is used here in a broad sense. It is not to be identified exclusively with ‘preaching’ or ‘pulpit ministry’).
(e) The Spirit of God whose activity is indispensable if there is to be reconciliation. Without the Spirit’s presence, Christ’s incarnation would remain a matter of past history, the Scriptures would be no more than a record of Jewish religion and the proclamation of the Church would be empty religious tradition. Whatever there may be of past and present tradition, there would be no reconciliation, for it is the Spirit who enables the message of Christ in the Scriptures and the proclamation of the Church to be a message of reconciliation which actually brings us into a new living relationship with God.
As we reflect on the importance of each of these five elements, we must emphasize the integral unity of the whole process of revelation through which God comes to us as our Creator and our Redeemer. No part can be ignored without affecting the whole.
(i) The loss of the perspective of creational revelation results in the loss of an adequate perspective on man’s sin, for man’s sin ‘is unmasked in its guilty character precisely because there is and remains revelation’ (General Revelation, p.31).
(ii) Without Christ, there can be no Christian faith, for without Christ, we have no Saviour.
(iii) Without the Scriptures, we would not have the message of Christ available to us (Holy Scripture, p.57 – Here, Berkouwer cites favourably ‘Calvin’s rejection of a spiritualism that makes great display of the superiority of the Spirit, but rejects all reading of Scripture itself’).
(iv) Without the Church’s proclamation of the message of reconciliation, that message would remain in the Bible without reaching those for whom it is intended (The Return of Christ, p.132 – Here, Berkouwer comments on our call to be a missionary Church. He insists that there can be ‘no distinction in this area between the “being” and the “well-being” of the church. It is a matter of the church’s very being to turn towards the world’).
(v) To lose the perspective of the Spirit is to open the door to the kind of barren rationalism which kills rather than giving life (2 Corinthians 3:6).
We need the presence and power of the Spirit if our knowledge of God is to be heart-knowledge of the kind which enables us to say, with Paul, ‘we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being changed into His likeness from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit’ (2 Corinthians 3:18).

Karl Barth and Paul Tillich: Responding to Theological Liberalism

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Two quite different responses to theological liberalism are represented in the theologies of Karl Barth and Paul Tillich.

In his protest against theological liberalism, Barth seeks to re-emphasize the lost emphases on man the sinner and God the Judge . In his article, “Liberal protestantism, Liberal Theology, Liberalism” in A. Richardson (editor), A Dicitonary of Christian Theology, (London, 1969), J. Richmond points out that Barth “has stressed the centrality and the kerygmatic character of the biblical writings, the radical discontinuity between God and human nature, and has made much of the concepts of crisis, judgment and grace” (p. 193).

In his attempt to overcome the defects of theological liberalism, Tillich advocates a symbolic reinterpretation of the Christian message. Richmond maintains that the theology of Tillich (and Bultmann) is “partly continuous with the liberal tradition” (p. 193). together with Bultmann, Tillich has “tried to avoid the excesses into which the older liberalism fell; but … their critics frequently bring against them the criticisms which were brought against their theological predecessors in the second decade of the twentieth century” (p. 194). The theologies of Barth and Tillich are governed by two contrasting forms of ontic thinking which threaten to relativize the urgency of the call to sinners to respond to God. Barth tends to approach man via a consideration of the divine transcendence. Tillich tends to move in the direction of the divine immanence via a consideration of man.

Barth’s theology stand over against liberalism in a way that the theologies of Tillich and Bultmann do not. A few weeks before his death, in a conversation with T. F. Torrance, Barth affirmed his faith in the “bodily resurrection” (T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, (Grand Rapids, 1976), p. xi). While Barth’s theology is very different from the theologies of Tillich and Bultmann, there is still some force in the cautious words of A. P. F. Sell concerning Barth’s theology as well as the theologies of Tillich and Bultmann: “Sadly, such theologians as Barth , Bultmann and Tillich have been in danger of disengaging the gospel from history in all its ambiguity and messiness” (God our Father, (Edinburgh, 1980), p. 14). The point at which the difficulty in relating Barth’s view of the divine transcendence to historical reality is most observable is the point where he seeks to speak adequately of the urgency of the decision between faith and unbelief. Barth’s ontological conclusions – the ontological inevitability of faith and the ontological impossibility of unbelief – tend to weaken his protest against theological liberalism. Despite Barth’s rejection of a priori universalism, it should be observed that these ontological conclusions do suggest that Barth has propounded “a natural theology of his own” by presenting “a form of universalism highly palatable to modern man” (C. Brown, Karl Barth and the Christian Message, (London, 1967, pp. 12, 137, emphases mine).

From the perspective of his doctrine of God as Being, Tillich may be viewed as heavily accenting the transcendencemethodologies used by Barth and Tillich. Broadly speaking, this is the contrast between the ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ approaches. Tillich’s ontological analysis of being, through which man’s being is presented as grounded in God as the Ground of Being tends to lead in the direction of an uncritical affirmation of modern man (as an illustration of this tendency, Brown (p. 78, n.3) refers the reader to Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, (Harmondsworth, 1962), pp. 63 ff.). Despite his rejection of rationalism, Tillich’s theology is highly appealing to rationalistic man. J. H. Thomas maintains that “(t)he liberal roots of Tillich’s theology are very evident” (Paul Tillich, (London, 1965), p. 5). Tillich’s interpretation of Christian truth is highly appealing to rationalistic man who does not take the Biblical witness to Jesus Christ particularly seriously. The weakness of the opposition of Barth and Tillich to theological liberalism lies not in the mere fact that both theologies, each in its own distinctive way, have a considerable appeal to modern man. rather, it lies in their failure to do justice to important aspects of the New Testament proclamation of the Gospel.

Tillich has failed to do justice to the historical revelation of the Gospel (B. J. R. Cameron, “The Historical Problem in Paul Tillich’s Christology”, Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 1965, pp. 257-272). Barth has failed to do justice to the human response to the Gospel. In highlighting Barth’s emphasis on divine transcendence, i am not overlooking the fact that Barth has written perceptively on The Humanity of God, (Atlanta, 1960) in which he write, “It is when we look at Jesus Christ that we know decisively that God’s deity does not exclude but includes His humanity” (p. 48, emphasis original). It should be noted Barth’s use of the expression, “the humanity of God” does not carry with it any suggestion that “Barth’s theology is humanistic” (J. Macquarrie, “Barth, Karl” in A Dictionary of Christian Theology, p. 30). Barth’s concern is to emphasize that the doctrine of God is not to be approached from the vantage-point of an abstract conception of deity. Rather, it is to be approached from the standpoint of the incarnation. This emphasis on the incarnation is essential if the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is to be clearly distinguished from the God of natural theology. The particular way in which Barth relates his whole theology to the incarnation does, nevertheless, raise the question of the adequacy of his treatment of the human response to the Gospel.

Both Barth and Tillch have allowed the structure of their theological systems to determine which aspects of new testament teaching are to be emphasized and which are to be virtually ignored (C. Brown, Karl Barth and the Christian Message, pp. 12, 152; K. Hamilton, “Paul Tillich”, in P. E. Hughes (ed.), Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology, (Grand Rapids, 1969), p. 473). Thus, neither is fully able to overcome the tendency of theological liberalism to allow reason to become predominant over revelation. The simple fact that both theologies proceed on the basis of divine revelation does not diminish the fact that, in the course of interpreting the revelation, the interests of the theological system have not lent themselves to a proper understanding of the entire Biblical proclamation of the Gospel. Christian theology must take care to avoid emphasizing a particular Biblical truth in such a way that other aspects of Biblical truth, equally important for a clearer understanding of the Gospel, tend to be misrepresented.

Berkouwer and Arminius

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Berkouwer’s understanding of divine election is best understood in terms of the Dutch Reformation. There, one finds a similar struggle to avoid determinism and thus emphasize the sincerity of the Gospel offer. These motifs are found in the writings of the Dutch Reformer, James Arminius. The strong similarities between Berkouwer and Arminius should not to be taken to mean that Berkouwer regards himself as standing – unequivocally – in the line of Arminius.

While rejecting the equal ultimacy of election and rejection, Berkouwer insists that his own position need not involve the acceptance of an Arminian position (Divine Election, p. 189, n. 31). In his book, Faith and Justification, he explains how his his own position differs from ‘Arminianism’. He opposes, in Arminianism, a most dangerous ‘overestimation of faith as a spiritual achievement’ (p.87). Alongside this criticism of Arminianism, we must set Berkouwer’s favourable attitude towards recent criticism of the very document which opposed Arminianism (the Canons of Dordt). He sees, in such criticism of the Canons of Dordt, the deepest intentions of the Arminians of the seventeenth-century (A Half Century of Theology, pp.104-105). In seeking to describe Berkouwer’s view of Arminius and Arminianism, it may be useful to distinguish between the view of Arminius and the later development of Arminiianism.

In his book, Arminius: A Study in the Dutch Reformation, Carl Bangs has made a number of observations about Arminius which suggest a striking similarity to Berkouwer (I have reviewed this book in Reformed Review, 4o, 2, 145).

(i) The historical situation in Holland was not a simple one of Calvinism coming in, Arminius nearly ruining it and the Synod of Dordt restoring it. Bangs comments, ‘The earliest Dutch Reformed leaders don’t seem to be Calvinists at all. They rise out of the soil, here and there, nurtured by the old Dutch piety, not seized by dogmatic insights but steadily pressing toward a purified life of faith, according to Scripture’ (p.21). This emphasis is similar to Berkouwer’s insistence that election is not a special gnosis for the theological elite. Rather, it is a confession of faith arising from the hearts of those who have come to know the grace of God (Divine Election, p.216).

(ii) Arminius’ theological method is ‘practical and through faith’: ‘For the Theology which belongs to this world, is practical and through faith: Theoretical Theology belongs to the other world, and consists of pure and unclouded vision. For this reason we must clothe the object of our Theology in such a manner as may enable us to worship God, and fully to persuade and win us over to that practice’ (cited by Bangs, p.63, from ‘Oration on the Object of Theology’ in The Works of James Arminius, I, p.264).

(iii) In Romans 9, Arminius finds the message of justification, the message of the freedom of God’s mercy, by which he determines that it will be the believer who will be saved. Bangs maintains that this interpretation of Romans 9 may be viewed as an affirmation of predestination. God has predestined to salvation all who believe in Christ. He also argues that Arminius stands in the Reformed tradition, since he insists that salvation is by grace alone and that human merit must be excluded as a cause of salvation. Only faith in Christ places the sinner in the company of the elect. Arminius’ understanding of Romans 9 is remarkably similar to the view expounded by Berkouwer as Reformed(Divine Election, pp.64-79, 209-217).

(iv) Against synergism – ‘half the work is God’s and half the work is man’s’ (see quotation from Sell, citing Duncan, below in (v)), Arminius affirms that grace is essential for the beginning, continuation and consummation of faith. He does, however, reject the distinction between a universal call which must be resisted and a special call which must be heeded – ‘Whomsoever God calls, he calls them seriously, with a will desirous of their repentance and salvation’ (Bangs, p. 343, citing ‘Certain Articles’ in The Works of James Arminius, I, p.497); ‘The whole controversy reduces itself to this question, “Is the grace of God a certain irresistible force?” … I believe that many persons resist the Holy Spirit and reject the grace that is offered’ (Bangs, p.343, citing The Works of James Arminius, pp. 253-254). Arminius’ point is that grace is not a force. Grace is a Person, the Holy Spirit, and in personal relationships there cannot be sheer overpowering. This is precisely what Berkouwer is concerned to maintain in his protest against the ‘ potestas absoluta’ (Divine Election, pp. 60ff.; The Return of Christ, p.444). It is precisely what Berkouwer means by his idea of the divine sovereignty as ‘the personal superiority of love and grace’ (Divine Election, pp. 49, 46).

(v) Regarding the enigmatic character of Arminius, Bangs writes, ‘Some Calvinists, finding that his writings do not produce the heresies they expected, have charged him with teaching secret heresy unpublshed. Many Arminians, finding him too Calvinistic, have written him off as a transitional thinker, a “forerunner”‘ (p. 18) (Here, we may also note the comment made by A P F Sell, in his book, The Great Debate, Calvinism, Arminianism and Salvation – ‘in important respects Arminius was not an Arminian’ (p. 97)). Berkouwer stands in the line of this element of the Dutch Reformation. To those who like to classify theologians as ‘Calvinists’ or ‘Arminians’, he is an enigma. He does not seem to fit. Perhaps, this is because he recognizes that the Gospel itself does not fit neatly into our systems (Again, we may note another comment from Sell – ‘Armnianism says that half the work is God’s and half the work is man’s. Calvinism asserts that the whole is God’s and the whole is man’s also’ (p. 1, citing Colloquia Peripatetica … being notes of conversations with the late John Duncan, p. 29). Note that Arminius’ rejection of this kind of ’synergism’ (see above in (iv)) is one of ‘the important respects’ in which, according to Sell, he was ‘not an Arminian’. For more of my own thoughts on Arminius in relation to ‘the five points of Calvinism’, see ‘Arminius – Hero or Heretic?’ in Evangelical Quarterly, 64:3 (1992), 213-227.)

(vi) Arminius was committed to the Reformed Confessions and their creative interpretation. He was concerned to teach nothing other than the teaching of the Dutch Confession of Faith and the Heidelberg Catechism (Bangs, pp. 460-461). he sought to present his teaching on predestination as true to the historic teaching of the Church, by which he meant the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism (p. 350). nonetheless, there was a curious duality about his relationship to the Confession and the Catechism. he believed his views were consonant with them yet he wanted them revised, reduced to the essentials, to remove the ambiguities that allowed for the views of his opponents (p. 315).

If Arminius is understood according to his deepest intentions and not according to a Pelagian distortion of his meaning, he can be regarded as a Reformed theologian, committed to the Confession and the Catechism, while maintaining an element of ambiguity with respect to them. This is essentially Berkouwer’s position. He seeks to interpret the Reformed standards, being careful to state which interpretation he favours and which he avoids. His favourable citation of recent developments in the confessional life of the Dutch Church has been noted, with the observation that his concern, in such discussions, has been for the interpretation rather than categorical rejection of the Canons of Dordt.

* Bangs points out that the historical situation in Holland was not a simple one – Calvinism coming in, Arminius nearly ruining it and the Synod of Dort restoring it:

“The earliest Dutch Reformed leaders don’t seem to be Calvinists at all. They rise out of the soil, here and there, nurtured by the old Dutch biblical piety, not seized by dogmatic insights, but steadily pressing toward a purified life of faith according to Scripture” (p. 21).

This emphasis is similar to Berkouwer’s insistence that election is not a special gnosis for the theological elite. Rather, it is a confession of faith, arising from the hearts of those who have come to know the grace of God (Divine Election (DE), p. 216).

* Bangs observes that Arminius’ theological method is “practical and through faith”: “For the Theology which belongs to this world, is practical and through faith: Theoretical Theology belongs to the other world, and consists of pure and unclouded vision. For this reason we must clothe the object of our Theology in such a manner as may enable us to worship God, and fully to persuade and win us over to that practice” (p. 63, citing “Oration on the Object of Theology”, The Works of James Arminius, D. D. (WJA), (London edition 1825, 1828, 1875), I, p. 264).

This understanding of theology bears an amazing similarity to Berkouwer’s doxological approach which sets the doctrine of election in the context of praise and thanksgiving (DE, pp. 26, 65).

* Bangs looks closely at Arminius’ exposition of Romans 9 (Chapter 14 – “Theology in Amsterdam: Romans 9; The Conference with Junius”, pp. 193-205).

In Romans 9, Arminius finds the message of justification, the message of the freedom of God’s mercy, by which He determines that it will be the believer who will be saved. This is an affirmation of predestination. God has predestined to salvation all who believe in Christ.

Bangs argues that Arminius stands in the Reformed tradition, since he insists that salvation is by grace alone and that human merit must be excluded as a cause of salvation. Only faith in Christ places the sinner in the company of the elect (p. 340). Arminius’ understanding of Romans 9 is remarkably similar to the view expounded by Berkouwer as Reformed (DE, pp. 64-79, 209-217).

* Against synergism, Arminius affirms that grace is essential for the beginning, continuation and consummation of faith. He does, however, reject the distinction between a universal call which must be resisted and a special call which must be heeded.

“Whomsoever God calls, he calls them seriously, with a will desirous pf their repentance and salvation” (Bangs, p. 343; citing “Certain Articles”, WJA, (London edition 1956), I, p. 497).

“The whole controversy reduces itself to this question, ‘Is the grace of God a certain irresistible force?’ … I believe that many persons resist the Holy Spirit and reject the grace that is offered” (Bangs, p. 343, citing WJA, 1956, pp. 253-254).

Arminius’ point is that grace is not a force. Grace is a Person, the Holy Spirit, and, in personal relationships, there cannot be sheer overpowering. This is precisely what Berkouwer is concerned to maintain in his protest against the ‘potestas absoluta’ (DE, pp. 60ff; cf The Return of Christ, p. 444). It is precisely what Berkouwer means by his idea of the divine sovereignty as “the personal superiority of love and grace” (DE, pp. 49, 46).

* Regarding the enigmatic character of Arminius, Bangs writes,

“Some Calvinists, finding that his writings do not produce the heresies they expected, have charged him with teaching secret heresy unpublished. Many Arminians, finding him too Calvinistic, have written him off as a transitional thinker, a ‘forerunner’” (p. 118; cf. A P F Sell, The Great Debate, Calvinism, Arminianism and Salvation (GD) – “in important respects Arminius was not an Arminian” (p. 97)).

Berkouwer stands in the line of this element of the Dutch Reformation. To those who like to classify theologians as ‘Calvinists’ or ‘Arminians’, he is an enigma. He does not seem to fit. Perhaps, this is because he recognizes that the Gospel itself does not fit neatly into our systems.

In his booklet, A Hole in the Dike: Critical Aspects of Berkouwer’s Theology, C W Bogue has difficulty in classifying Berkouwer within his own Calvinist – Arminian distinction (p. 19).

A helpful manner of stating the difference between Calvinism and Arminianism is found in A P F Sell, GD. – “Arminianism says that half the work is God’s and half the work is man’s. Calvinism asserts that the whole is God’s and the whole is man’s also” (p. 1, citing Colloquia Peripatetica … being notes of conversations with the late John Duncan, 6th edition, 1907, p. 29).

* Arminius was committed to the Reformed Confessions and their creative interpretation. He was concerned to teach nothing other than the teaching of the Dutch Confession of Faith and the Heidelberg Catechism (Bangs, pp. 460-461).

He sought to present his teaching of predestination as true to the historic teaching of the Church, by which he meant the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism (p. 350).

Nonetheless, there was a curious duality about his relationship to the Confession and the Catechism.

He believed his views to be consonant with them yet he wanted them to be revised, reduced to the essentials, to remove the ambiguities that allowed for the views of his opponents (p. 315).

* If Arminius is understood according to his deepest intentions and not according to a Pelagian distortion of his meaning, he can be regarded as a Reformed theologian, committed to the Confession and the Catechism, while maintaining an element of ambiguity with respect to them.

In essence, this is Berkouwer’s position. He seeks to interpret the Reformed standards, being careful to state which interpretation he favours and which he avoids.

In his favourable citation of recent developments in the confessional life of the Dutch
Church, his concern is with interpretation rather than categorical rejection of the Canons of Dort.

A child of the Reformation, Berkouwer seeks always to interpret, rather than categorically reject, the Reformers and the Reformed Confessions.

He bears a marked affinity to the Dutch reformation, “nurtured by the old Dutch biblical piety, steadily pressing toward a purified life of faith according to the Scriptures” (Bangs, p. 21).

When we make a connection between Berkouwer and “the old Dutch biblical piety”, we should note also his “consistent apologetic intention … directed against scholasticism” (S Meijers, Objectiviteit en Existentialitet (Objectivity and Existentiality), p.448).

His work is done in a pietistic rather than a scholastic perspective. This does not lead him into subjectivism. It does enable him to deal with the living character of God’s Word.


Avoiding Mindless Fideism and Faithless Rationalism

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In his review of Berkouwer’s book, A Half Century of Theology in Themelios, Vol. 4, No. 1, New Series, September 1978, pp. 40-41, Bruce Demarest describes Berkouwer’s view of faith and reason, Demarest commends him for his careful avoidance of “the polarities of a mindless fideism and a faithless rationalism” (p. 41).

Pride and Faith in Berkouwer’s "Studies in Dogmatics" (introduction)

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‘The great theologians from Paul and Augustine to G. C. Berkouwer and Karl Barth … have been
able to explain what the faith does not mean as well as what it means.’1 This is a short study in
the writings of one of those great theologians named here by D. G. Bloesch. G. C. Berkouwer,
Emeritus Professor of Systematic Theology at the Free University of Amsterdam has been
described as one of ‘the best theological writers of our day’, ‘one of the genuinely significant
leaders of Christian thought in our day’. His Studies in Dogmatics, running¯in English
translation to thirteen volumes, has been described as ‘one of the most ambitious undertakings
in contemporary theology’. Berkouwer has been commended for his ‘complete familiarity with
all the currents in contemporary theology’. Concerning Berkouwer, it has been said that ‘the
theological student who neglects him is not wise’.2 In this study, we will explore the meaning of
faith by considering both what faith is and what it is not. This will be done by tracing the
contrasting themes of pride and faith in Berkouwer’s Studies in Dogmatics. To assist us in
structuring our thinking about pride and faith, we will consider these themes under three major
headings: man’s need of salvation; God’s provision of salvation; the believer’s experience of
salvation.
—–
1 D. G. Bloesch, The Ground of Certainty, (Grand Rapids, 1971), 61.
2 These words of commendation from E. T. Ramsdell and Dr. Dale Moody are found on the rear dust cover of
Berkouwer’s Studies in Dogmatics.

Pride and Faith in Berkouwer’s "Studies in Dogmatics" (The believer’s experience of salvation)

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Central to Berkouwer’s exposition of Christian experience are three books which might be called
a kind of trilogy – Faith and Justification, Faith and Sanctification, and Faith and Perseverance.
These titles emphasize the importance of faith in the theology of Berkouwer. From beginning to
end, the Christian life is a life of faith. In each of these books, Berkouwer stresses that true faith
in Jesus Christ is in direct contrast to the sinful pride of man by which he glories in himself rather than in the Lord.
Commenting on the meaning of justification by faith, Berkouwer writes, ‘Everything is really
said in an unobtrusive phrase, in Christ.’ On the subject of Faith and Justification, he continues,
faith… is not added as a second, independent ingredient which makes its own contribution to
justification in Christ… faith does nothing but accept, or come to rest in the sovereignty of
His benefit … we are not acceptable to God because of the worthiness of our faith. Grace is
exclusively and totally God’s.
Citing John Calvin, Berkouwer describes the nature of faith thus: ‘faith looks away from itself to
Christ’. With this understanding of faith, Berkouwer offers a helpful analysis of the doctrine of
sola fide (by faith alone) and sola gratia (by grace alone): ‘Solo fide and sola gratia … mean the
same thing.’ In these doctrines, by faith alone and by grace alone, God is glorified and man is
humbled. On the final page of Faith and Justification, Berkouwer issues a warning against man’s
sinful pride. It is a warning which is grounded in the gospel doctrines of salvation: by faith alone
and by grace alone ‘let the sound of sola fide-sola gratia ring in the life of the Church. Let it
be a warning against the pride of the treacherous heart.’9
These doctrines of salvation – by faith alone and by grace alone – also lie at the heart of
Berkouwer’s exposition of Faith and Sanctification. He stresses that ‘in the New Testament all
admonition is grounded in and proceeds from the mercy of God’. When the mercy of God is
magnified, the pride of man is brought low – ‘the Scriptures preach humility: the only suitable
response to the mercy of God.’ How is man able to walk in the way of humility? It is the work of
the Holy Spirit: ‘he spirit alone could perform the miracle of making man walk on the road of
sanctity without a sense of his own worth.’ How long is man to walk in the way of humility? The
believers life-long experience is to be a walk in humility; ‘This humility is not to be sloughed off
as believers advance to new levels but to be preserved as long as grace communicates itself.’ This call to humility brings with it a strong warning against human pride: if anything is clear in the message of Scripture, it is that in sanctification there is never, under any circumstances, any room for self-pride or self-praise.10
This emphasis on humility also comes out strongly in Berkouwer’s volume on Sin, where he
maintains that ‘(i)n the mystery of the Spirit there is no greater gift than this gift of humility’.
Concerning the importance of humility, he writes, ‘it is identified with the gift of conversion
itself since “(o)nly those who are humble can escape the judgment of which the Gospel speaks:
He has scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts” (Luke 1:51)’. Berkouwer speaks of
humility in connection with ‘the mystery of the Spirit’ since it is only through the power of the
Holy Spirit that sinful man can be led into and kept on the way of humility. Concerning this
ministry of the Holy Spirit, Berkouwer writes, ‘In reproving and rebuking, in comforting and
counselling, the Holy Spirit maintains a Christian in humility.’11 If we are not to walk in the way
of sinful pride, we must learn to walk in the way of humble faith. In this, the Holy Spirit is our
Teacher.
Berkouwer’s strong emphasis on the grace of God, with its warning against man’s sinful pride, is
maintained in the third part of the trilogy, Faith and Perseverance. Here, he stresses that we are
not concerned with ‘perseverance … by one’s own power’. Rather, we must direct attention to
‘the persevering grace and power of God… the faithfulness of God’. In maintaining this emphasis
on divine grace, Berkouwer insists that’(t)he grace of God is never the cause for glorying in one’s
own power’ and that ‘(p)erseverance is always opposed to false self-confidence.’ There is, in
Berkouwer’s trilogy on the Christian life, an echo of Calvin’s Institution which never tire of repeating the warning against every attempt at gaining assurance apart from Christ and His cross.12
The fact that Berkouwer has written this trilogy on justification, sanctification and perseverance
should not lead us to suppose that he is concerned only with personal faith and has nothing to say about the corporate aspects of Christian faith. In his book, The Church, he gives attention to the relationship between the individual believer and the fellowship of God’s people. Berkouwer stresses that in ‘God’s saving reconciling action (t)he individual does not disappear’. Instead, ‘he
is liberated from individualization and solitariness in order to have a place in this new
fellowship.’ In the purpose of God, both the individual believer and the fellowship of the Lord’s
people have their important place: Every individual need receives his undivided attention; yet, at the same time, ways are opened by which the individual receives a place in a human fellowship, ending all individualism.13
In his understanding of the relationship between the believer and the church, there is a warning
against both individualistic pride and ecclesiastical pride. The individual believer dares not stand apart from the church because it is not all that it should be.
The church dares not conceive of itself as an impersonal organizational or institution which can
nun roughshod over its individual members.
Consideration of the believer’s place within the church leads us on to The Sacraments of baptism
and the Lord’s Supper. Here, we are called away from our sinful pride. Concerning baptism,
Berkouwer writes, ‘The fundamental fact about baptism will always be its involvement with the
death of Christ.’ Developing this idea further in connection with the meaning of baptism,
Berkouwer makes an important point: The prevenient aspect of the grace of God lies not in the temporal priority of the acts of God in baptism in comparison with the conscious acceptance of the divine promise, but in the temporal priority of the cross of Christ with respect to the baptized person, whether child or adult. A particular form of baptism, whether believers baptism or infant baptism, must not become such a source of doctrinal or denominational pride that we lose contact with the only legitimate boasting: ‘God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ’ (Gal. 6:14).
In his exposition of the meaning of the Lord’s Supper, Berkouwer comments helpfully on the
phrase ‘worthy partakers’. They are those who confess their sins in self-abhorrence, humiliation, faith in God’s promises, and gratefulness of heart. This is the ‘worthiness’ that belongs to the Lord’s Supper. It is not at all meritorious in nature, but is in complete harmony with what is signified and sealed in the Lord’s Supper. It is a worthiness that coincides with a confession of
‘unworthiness’ and with trust in the salvation of God.14
This insightful explanation of what it means to worthily partake of the Lord’s Supper presents a
holy and yet loving rebuke to man’s spiritual pride, whatever form it may take. There is a rebuke for those who, while speaking of their own unworthiness, proudly refuse to receive – by
faith – the salvation which God, in love, offers to them in Christ. There is a rebuke also for those
who take the love of God for granted, coming to the Lord’s Table as a matter of mere religious
ritual.
The celebration of the Lord’s Supper directs our attention toward the Second Coming of our Lord
Jesus Christ – ‘For as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord’s
death until he comes’ (1 Cor. 11:26). This is an oft-repeated reminder to us that the life of faith is
a life that is directed toward the future. In his book, The Return of Christ, Berkouwer emphasizes
that we must approach the future with a living faith and not with proud complacency.
Challenging the teaching which moves directly from the love of God to the notion that all will be
saved, he writes: ‘it is extremely dangerous to think and talk about “the love of God” and what
follows from it outside of the gospel.’ The way of living faith is quite different from a proud
complacency which simply assumes that all will be saved. Here, Berkouwer refers to ‘the
question addressed to Jesus… “Lord, will those who are saved be few?” ’. He points out that
‘Jesus’ answer seems so noncommittal, so evasive’. Concerning Jesus’ answer: ‘Strive to enter
by the narrow door (Luke 13:23f.)’, Berkouwer comments, ‘this evasiveness is only apparent’,
adding this insightful remark:
This is the answer to this question … this question has been answered, once for all time.15
In all our theological study, there is one thing we must never forget. Whenever we bring our
questions to God, he gives his answers, but they are not answers which bolster our proud
complacency. They are answers which call us to faith, a living faith, a growing faith, a faith
which brings glory to God.

—–
9 Faith and Justification, (Grand Rapids, 1954), 43, 175, 44, 201.
10 Faith and Sanctification, (Grand Rapids, 1952), 25, 125, 78, 117.
11 Sin, (Grand Rapids, 1871), 228-9.
12 Faith and Perseverance, (Grand Rapids, 1958), 228-9.
13 The Church, (Grand Rapids, 1976), 77.
14 The Sacraments, (Grand Rapids, 1969), 118, 176, 256-7.

A Critique of J D Bettis, "Is Karl Barth a Universalist?"

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The question of universalism in Barth’s theology has been raised directly by J D Bettis in his article, “Is Karl Barth a Universalist?” (Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 1967, pp. 423-436).This article requires to be carefully discussed not only for its significance as an interpretation of Barth’s thought but also because it presents a serious misrepresentation of Berkouwer’s criticism of Barth.

Bettis writes, “Modern protestant theology has defined three basic answers to the question of the particularity of election: double predestination, Arminianism and universalism” (p. 423).

By attempting to fit Berkouwer into “this structure of alternatives” (p. 423), he misrepresents completely Berkouwer’s criticism of Barth. According to Bettis, Brunner and Berkouwrer hold that “because Barth fails to accept either Brunner’s Arminianism or Berkouwe’s double decreer, he must be a universalist” (p. 426). There are two misrepresentations of Berkouwer here.

(a) In Divine Election (DE) (Chapters Six and Seven – “Election and Rejection”, pp. 172-217 and “Election and the Preaching of the gospel”, pp. 218-253), Berkouwer dissociates himself from the idea of the double decree. In The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth (TG), he writes, “I am of the opinion that … one can judge soundly of the scriptural doctrine of election only when one rejects this symmetry (i.e. the ‘equal ultimacy’ of election and reprobation)” which he describes as “an unbiblical distortion of the message of the Divine election” (p. 391, brackets mine).

(b) Berkouwer never states that Barth is a universalist on the basis that he must be a universalist. He acknowledges that Barth dissociates himself from universalism. He does, however, question the effectiveness of Barth’s rejection of universalism. Berkouwer discusses this question in TG, Chapter X, “The Universality of the Triumph”, pp. 262-296. He acknowledges “Barth’s express rejection of the doctrine of the apokatastasis” (p. 266). It is precisely because Barth is, by his own profession, not a universalist that the discussion of his theology is so important. Bettis asks the question, “Is Katl Barth a Universalist?” In terms of Barth’s own words, this question can be answered with a simple “No”. The subsequent question, “Is Karl Barth’s rejection of universalism convincing?” is the central question.

If Bettis had made the latter question more central, he might have followed through his own critical remarks (p. 433) more fully (more about this later) rather than concentrating chiefly on a defence of Barth, which disposes of his critics by means of misrepresentation. Bettis could not have been so uncritical if he had taken Berkouwer’s critique seriously. This would, however, have required genuine dialogue rather than unfair dismissal!

Bettis contends that “For Barth, one can reject both Arminianism and double predestination without having to accept universalism” (p. 423). This statement might have been written of Berkouwer, whom, it may be argued, rejects this structure of alternatives more convincingly than Barth does. It may also be argued that the precise nature of Berkouwer’s criticism of Barth can only be properly understood when his rejection of this structure of alternatives is recognized.

Berkouwer’s rejection of this structure of alternatives is observable in his book, Faith and Justification, where he writes, “Everything is really said in an unobtrusive phrase, in Christ, … faith is not added as a second, independent ingredient which makes its own contribution to justification in Christ … faith does nothing but accept, or come to rest in the sovereignty of His benefit … we are not acceptable to God because of the worthiness of our faith. Grace is exclusively and totally God’s” (p. 43, emphasis original), “a speculative logic can invade a scriptural proclamation of salvation and torture it beyond recognition … When speculation on time and eternity, with eternity swallowing up the significance of time, determines the line of thought, there is no possibility of doing justice … to justification through faith within the temporal reality of our lives” (p. 150), “Barth’s conception of the relation between election and faith … (bears) a similarity to universalism” (pp. 196-197, emphasis mine) by which he is brought “continually to the precipice (emphasis mine) of apokatastasis (italics original) or universalism” (p. 165).

This raises the question whether “Barth really does justice to the depth of earnestness in the scriptural witness” (p. 165).

It is clear, then, from Faith and Justification as well as Divine Election and The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth that Berkouwer rejects the system of alternatives: Arminianism, the double decree, universalism.

It is, therefore, inaccurate to suggest that Berkouwer accepts a system of alternatives rejected by Barth. Both reject this system of alternatives. The crucial question is: Which rejection of this system of alternatives is the more convincing – Berkouwer’s or Barth’s?

Bettis maintains that “Barth consistently rejects universalism as a doctrine” (p. 427, emphasis mine). The problem with this estimation of Barth’s rejection of universalism is that it does not take sufficient account of Barth’s own words: “Even though theological consistency might seem to lead our thoughts and utterances in this direction (universal reconciliation), we must not arrogate to ourselves that which can be given and received only as a free gift” (Church Dogmatics (CD), Vol. IV, 3, first half, p. 477; cited by Bettis, p. 433, emphasis mine). Barth’s rejection of universalism is not motivated by the interests of theological consistency which, he acknowledges, might seem to lead towards universal reconciliation.

Bettis notes that Barth “leaves open the possibility that within God’s freedom all men may be saved” (p. 427). Barth holds that, because of the freedom of divine love, even the believing man can never escape the threat of eternal rejection (CD, Vol. IV, 3, first half, p. 477, cited by Bettis, p. 433). Thus, Barth’s rejection of universalism is rooted in the idea that the future of all men is uncertain.

This notion involves a conception of God’s freedom which might be characterized as a freedom to be ungracious. Barth’s entire theology appears to proclaim the grace of God. This conception of divine freedom seems to suggest, however, that the affirmation of grace requires to be qualified by the possibility that God might not be gracious.

While the chief direction of Barth’s theology is towards assurance grounded in the revelation of divine grace, it seems that such assurance must be qualified by a recognition of the divine freedom to withhold this grace.

Admittedly, Barth’s intention is to stress that grace is a free gift which no man has any right to expect from God. This principle is, in itself, unassailable. When, however, the universal threat of eternal rejection is set over against the divine reconciliation in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the issue is not one of man’s rights but of the faithfulness of the divine promise of grace to be received through faith in Christ.

The divine reconciliation in Christ strips man of all the rights he supposes himself to have. At the same time, however, this reconciliation provides the believing man with a gracious assurance which is vouched for by God Himself in His divine promise of grace.

This assurance has nothing at all to do with man’s rights and everything to do with the free grace of God which has been pledged to believing man through Christ.

Barth writes, “We should be denying … that evil attempt (the persistent attempt to change the truth into untruth) and our own participation in it, if in relation to ourselves or others or all men, we were to postulate a withdrawal of that threat … No such postulate can be made even though we appeal to the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ … we must not arrogate to ourselves that which can be given and received only as a free gift” (CD, Vol. IV, 3, first half, p. 477; cited by Bettis, p. 433).

Barth’s intention – to emphasize that grace is God’s free gift – is to be appreciated. It should, however, be asked whether he has not set ‘God in Himself’ over against ‘God for us’.

What are we to make of this suggestion that God might yet withdraw His saving grace from those who believe? It rules out the possibility of the assurance of salvation. It also casts aspersions of doubt on the reliability of the divine promise of grace which is received through faith in Christ.

Christian assurance is not a form of presumption which takes God’s grace for granted. Rather, it is an assurance which is rooted in the reliability of God in His gracious self-revelation in Christ.

If this revelation of grace is to be qualified by a concept of divine freedom which can be isolated from God’s self-revelation in history, it can only be done at the expense of introducing both an element of arbitrariness into the doctrine of God and a basic uncertainty into the believer’s knowledge of God.

It may be that the particular form of Barth’s rejection of universalism arises directly from the universalist structure of his theology.

He conceives of God’s dealings with men in universal terms. God’s dealings are with ‘man’ rather than with the believer and the unbeliever. In criticizing this aspect of Barth’s thought, it is not being denied that there is a “(k)erygmatic universality” (Berkouwer, DE, p. 240). It is, however, to question whether Barth has represented rightly the nature of this universality.

In Barth’s theology, there is no suggestion of a dichotomy between the believer and the unbeliever. The introduction of such a dichotomy into his rejection of universalism would run counter to the whole tenor of his theology. Barth, therefore, insists that universal reconciliation may not be postulated since the threat of eternal rejection hangs over all men because all men are sinners.

Recognizing that Barth’s notion of divine freedom entails the devaluation of the trustworthiness of the salvation of God in Christ, Bettis writes, “Rather than ask whether Barth attributes too much to the work of Christ, the real question is whether Barth attributes enough to Christ’s work. If it is not to remove the threat of permanent rejection for those who believe, what is the purpose of the crucifixion and resurrection?” (p. 433).

Barth’s concept of divine freedom prevents him from giving an adequate answer to this question. For this reason, his rejection of universalism remains quite unconvincing.

Since Barth thinks of the election of grace in universal categories, it follows that his rejection of universalism is presented in universal categories. The ontic structure of Barth’s thinking concerning the universal election of grace lies behind Barth’s rejection of universalism.

Bettis comments, “Barth does not reject universalism because the future of the pagan is uncertain. He rejects universalism because the future of all men is uncertain” (p. 433).

Since Barth thinks of ‘man’ and his relation to the divine gracious election in universal categories, he cannot, without undermining the whole structure of his theology, posit a withdrawal of grace from some men (i.e. unbelievers) only, for this would be to make man’s faith (or unbelief) decisive in a way that Barth has consistently refused to do (In TG, p.113, Berkouwer describes Barth’s view thus: “The divine decision … can … not be undone by any human decision”).

If the freedom of God is to be used as a basis for rejecting universalism, it must, in Barth’s view, be a freedom to withhold grace not only from some men but from all men.

Barth states that both the idea of universal reconciliation and the idea of the damnation of all men are “formal conclusions without substantial content” (Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, Vol.II, 2, p. 461; cited by Berkouwer in TG, p. 117). It must, however, be pointed out that even the suggestion of the possibility of the damnation of all men has drastic consequences for the understanding of the faithfulness of the God of revelation and the unity of His redemptive work.

A rejection of universalism on this basis does not represent a defence of free grace. It is the introduction of a rather formless freedom which relativizes the divine faithfulness.

If universalism and this type of rejection of universalism are adjudged to be unsatisfactory, there needs to be further reflection concerning the meaning of kerygmatic universality.

Bettis insists that “Barth’s rejection of universalism is consistent with his … strong and clear intention of refusing to identify the love of God with a cosmic plan of redemption and with refusing to identify the gospel with information about that plan” (pp. 435-436, accompanied by footnote (n. 1) to CD, Vol. II, 2, pp.76-93).

Before looking more closely at this statement, it should be pointed out that it might have been made of Berkouwer who writes, “it is extremely dangerous to think and talk about ‘the love of God’ and what ‘follows’ from it outside of the gospel” (The Return of Christ (RC), p. 422). He insists that “the tender mercy of God … is not the point of departure for logical conclusions on our part” (RC, p. 423). He resists “the persistent and almost irresistible inclination to go outside the proclamation of the gospel to find a deeper gnosis, whether in the form of certain knowledge or only as a surmise”, insisting that there is “only one ‘necessity’ … ‘Necessity … is laid upon me. Woe to me, if I do not preach the gospel!’ (1 Cor. 9:16)” (RC, p. 423). He stresses that the Gospel’s answer to the question of the number of the saved is found in Jesus’ words: “Strive to enter by the narrow door” (p. 423).

Bettis rightly points out that Barth’s rejection of universalism is consistent with his clear intention of refusing to identify the Gospel with a cosmic plan of redemption and the Gospel with information about that plan.

He might, however, have raised the more important question of whether either of these motifs is consistent with other aspects of Barth’s thought.

Bettis writes, “Barth rejects universalism because the premise of its argument is that God’s love is good because it saves men” (p. 436).

A universalist might, however, argue, with some justification, that this represents a reversal of the universalist argument. A universalist might contend that the effect (“it saves men”) is grounded in the cause (“God’s love is good”) and is not seen as the factor which determines his view of God’s love. A universalist might even state that Barth has been a formative influence on his doctrine of God!

Bettis contrasts universalism with Barth’s view. Universalism is concerned with an “ontological reorganisation of the universe” concerning which men are to be informed. “Barth knows that men are not justified by knowledge, even knowledge of God’s plan for their lives. Men are justified through faith” (p. 436).

There appears to be a selectivity in Bettis’ analysis which leads to a failure to acknowledge adequately the tension in Barth’s doctrine of salvation.

Barth speaks of the “eternal destruction” of those who do not believe that they are God’s children from eternity” (CD, Vol. I. 2, p. 238). On what basis are those who are God’s children from eternity to be committed to eternal destruction? Is it on the basis of a lack of a “(s)ubjective revelation” which, in Barth’s view, is “not the addition of a second revelation to objective revelation” (p. 238)? Is it on the basis of the raising and answering of the question of our destiny at a different point from the Son of God’s assumption of humanity (p. 238)? Barth answers both questions in the negative. Barth holds that “the truth” (p. 238; i.e. the objective truth) is that he is a child of God from eternity (“’in Christ’ … reconciled … elect … called … justified … sanctified”, p. 240) even when he is “not in the truth” (p. 238; i.e. subjectively).

It is questionable whether Barth has understood the relationship between salvation and judgment in a Biblical way. It might also be asked whether Barth’s belief in the reality of eternal destruction might not have led him to think and to speak differently of the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity. 

In his article, “Is Karl Barth a Universalist?”, Bettis has not shown any awareness of the kind of theological perspective on grace and faith offered to us by Berkouwer. The lack of real understanding of Berkouwer’s view is highlighted in Bettis’ statement that Brunner and Berkouwer hold that “because Barth fails to accept either Brunner’s Arminianism or Berkouwer’s double decree, he must be a universalist.” In view of all that Berkouwer has written in his book, “Divine Election”, I wonder where Bettis gets the idea that Berkouwer thinks in terms of a “double decree.”
Another point of interest here concerns Bettis’ interpretation of Brunner. I’m less familiar with Brunner’s work. I do, however, remember that,in his book, “Our Faith”, he was critical of the double decree. He did speak of election in a way that was a bit different from Berkouwer. I recall Brunner speaking of people being invited to accept or reject their “election.” Berkouwer, on the other hand, emphasizes that it is only out of the experience of divine grace that we can speak of divine election. This is an important distinction. What Berkouwer is saying about election is not the same as saying that you can accept or reject your election.
He insists that a proper understanding of theological language is only attainable within the context of an encounter with the divine object of faith. He holds that a proper understanding of theological language involves the recognition of the inexpressible character of the divine object of faith which the believer encounters in the obedience of faith. The gift of God’s grace in Christ is an “inexpressible gift” (2 Corinthians 9:15, RSV). When the believer seeks to express his gratitude to God for this inexpressible gift, he finds it quite impossible to give adequate expression to this gratitude, which he feels so deeply. He is almost certain to use language which, at best, will contain certain ambiguities and, at worst, misleading impressions if his language is not recognized as a groping after a form of expression that is worthy of a virtually inexpressible Reality.
While I cannot pass any detailed comment on Brunner’s critique of Barth, I should point out that Berkouwer never stated that “Barth must be a universalist.” He did, however,ask the question, “How convincing is Barth’s rejection of universalism?” While Bettis is not entirely uncritical of Barth, I think that Berkouwer’s book, “The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth”, is a much deeper analysis of Barth’s theology. The moment Bettis makes any criticism of Barth, we must ask him, “Where are you taking us?” As I recall, he is neither taking us in the direction of any of the “three basic answers” – double predestination, Arminianism and universalism” nor is he offering any other option which enables us to get beyond the “three basic answers.” Bettis has given us an article on Karl Barth. He has unfairly dismissed Berkouwer. we are left wondering, “Where exactly does Bettis himself stand on these matters.” I think that, in fairness to Berkouwer, there is much more of a positive statement of his own view of election than we get from Bettis. In Berkouwer’s book, “A Half Century of Theology”, the chapter on “The Heart of the Church” provides a very helpful discussion of the doctrine of divine election. In my book on Berkouwer, I have commented on this chapter. My comments were set within the context of a discussion of Berkouwer’s approach to apologetics. Emphasizing the apologetic value of Berkouwer’s doctrine of election, these are the points that I made:
(i) He discerns the harmful effects of a deterministic doctrine of election.
(ii) He acknowledges that the deterministic interpretation of election has, for many, proved to be an obstacle to faith.
(iii) He affirms the primacy of divine revelation over human reason.
(iv) He refuses to be content with “the construction pf defensive syntheses.”
(v) He has thought seriously about difficult theological concepts and biblical passages.
(vi) Through honest questioning, he has reached a positive position.
(vii) His position could provide an aid towards faith for the person drawn to nihilism because of disillusionment with the deterministic notion of divine sovereignty.

Berkouwer rejects a priori universalism without losing a proper perspective on the divine freedom. From Berkouwer’s perspective, the possibility of universal reconciliation would be related not to the freedom of God to be ungracious but to the freedom of God to be gracious.

Such a conception of divine freedom would be more consistent with the Gospel as a revelation of grace than Barth’s introduction of the idea of the freedom of God as a qualification placed on a theology which bears an inherently universalist structure.

Barth’s notion of divine freedom raises problems regarding his theology of revelation. The suggestion that believing man stands under the threat of eternal rejection tends to relativize the reality of God’s gracious revelation. The faithfulness of the God of revelation is called in question. Thus, it becomes difficult to distinguish between divine freedom and arbitrariness.

In A Half Century of Theology, pp. 45-49, Berkouwer emphasizes Barth’s “strong opposition to theological arbitrariness” (p. 46). Concerned to draw attention to “the free and gracious gift of God” (p. 49, emphasis original), Barth insists that “(t)here is no way leading from us to grace … (since) (t)hat … would be the worst kind of Pharisaism” (p. 49, emphasis and brackets mine; with reference to though not a direct citation of CD, Vol. IV, 1, p. 617). It is against the arbitrariness of “all false boasting” (p. 48) that Barth emphasizes the freedom of God’s grace

The way in which Barth argues for the freedom of God’s grace is questionable. In challenging Barth’s way of speaking of God’s freedom, I would maintain that an appeal to the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ is precisely the opposite of arrogating to ourselves that which can be given and received only as a free gift. It is a looking away from ourselves to the Saviour. There is no genuine appeal to the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ where there is any thought that salvation can ever be anything other than a free gift.

Barth’s intention, in CD, Vol. IV, 3, first half, p. 477, may be to warn against false boasting. His manner of speaking does, however, open the door to a conception of divine freedom which goes beyond a protest against false boasting.

In Barth’s conception of divine freedom, there appears to be no essential connection between the historical revelation in which God promises salvation to those who believe and the eschatological possibility that this salvation might yet be withheld from those who believe.

If the freedom of God is not to become a formless freedom which conflicts with the affirmation of the gracious character of revelation, it requires to be understood that “the universality of the New Testament … is nowhere made into an objective state of affairs” (Berkouwer, DE, p. 240).

When objectivity and subjectivity are not set in tension with each other, a priori universalism may be rejected without recourse to either an arbitrary avoidance of theological consistency or an arbitrary conception of divine freedom which suggests that God may, in His eschatological judgment, act in a manner that is unfaithful to the promise of grace given in His historical revelation.

The significance of man’s faith is fully recognized when the reality of the divine faithfulness in God’s promise of grace is upheld. The significance of unbelief is emphasized in the face of the warning of the Gospel. Thus, the significance of man can be affirmed over against the universalist devaluation of the seriousness of unbelief and the threatening of faith’s significance by an a-historical conception of divine freedom.

Thus, without any sacrifice of theological consistency, it can be affirmed unambiguously that “Kerygmatic universality does not preclude but include(s) the call to belief and repentance” (Berkouwer, p. 240).

The question arises most pointedly in view of Barth’s affirmation of the reality of eternal destruction (CD, Vol. I, 2, p. 238) whether it is sufficient for Barth, in his preaching of the gospel, to say, “By grace you have been saved! – this is true, even though we may not believe it, may not accept it as valid for ourselves”, even allowing for his words, “and unfortunately in so doing may forego his benefits” (Deliverance to the Captives, p. 40, emphasis original).

In the broader context of contemporary theology, Berkouwer and Barth have much in common. Both affirm the reality of divine grace. Both affirm the doctrine of divine election. Both affirm the centrality of Christ in this doctrine. Berkouwer welcomes Barth’s emphasis on both God’s sovereignty and God’s love, his emphasis on both divine election and Jesus Christ: “We ….must listen to his warning not to separate God’s sovereignty from His love, and His election from Jesus Christ, for in view of the many dangers and misunderstandings this warning becomes necessary” (DE, p. 161). There are, however, significant differences between Berkouwer and Barth (for more on Berkouwer’s understanding of divine election, see my post, “Loved with Everlasting Love”). In affirming the reality of divine grace, the doctrine of divine election and the centrality of Christ, they have not spoken with a single voice. The voice of Barth has been more dominant than that of Berkouwer. The more we become aware of Berkouwer’s distinctive contribution, the more he will be appreciated as a theologian whose work is to be highly valued.

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